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THE EU!UK JOINT REPORT of December 2017 recognised
the possibility for a diﬀerentiated Brexit that would allow
Northern Ireland to maintain a special relationship with
the EU. Such an arrangement could occur if addressing the
challenge of the Irish border through the overall future EU-
UK relationship proves impossible and if the specific tech-
nological solutions the UK proposes are deemed insuﬃ-
cient. Indeed, the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland of
the dra# UK Withdrawal Treaty the EU published on 28
February 2018 codified such a ‘backstop option’. 
The present Independent Opinion suggests that the UK
Withdrawal Agreement should recognise the unique cir-
cumstances of Northern Ireland by providing for a special
designated status. Such a status should be understood as a
mutually agreed arrangement that will respect and protect
the unique constitutional status of the region as provided
by all three Strands of the Good Friday Agreement. In par-
ticular, the special designated status should respect the
principle of consent and the right of self-determination by
providing for a legal route for the reintegration of Northern
Ireland into the EU. This status should protect the all-island
economy by allowing for the participation of the region in
the single market and/or the EU Customs Union (EUCU).
This situation should not happen at the expense of weaken-
ing ‘East-West’ institutions, however (i.e. between the Re-
public of Ireland and the UK); in fact, their strengthening
will be necessary in order to manage the tensions that
Northern Ireland’s remaining in the single market and the
EUCU would likely cause to its economic relationship with
the rest of the UK.
Report on a Special Designated Status
for Northern Ireland Post-Brexit
*. The findings of this Independent Opinion are largely based on two academic publications: ‘From Britain and Ireland to Cyprus: Accommodating “Divided Islands” in
the EU Political and Legal Order’, EUI Working Paper AEL 2016/02; and ‘Territorial Diﬀerentiation in EU Law: Can Scotland and Northern Ireland Remain in the EU
and/or the Single Market?’ 19, Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (2017), 287–310.
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ON 23 JUNE 2016, 52 per cent of voters who participated
in the Brexit referendum voted to leave the EU. Northern
Ireland and Scotland, two of the four UK constituent na-
tions, voted to remain: in Northern Ireland, 55.7 per cent
voted against Brexit, while 62 per cent did so in Scotland.
Since that time, the Scottish government has forcefully ar-
gued in favour of Scotland remaining in the single market,
even a#er Brexit.1 So far, the UK government has rejected
the Scottish proposals.2 At the same time, in Northern Ire-
land the main political parties hold opposing views on
Brexit, while the power-sharing arrangement has collapsed
since the beginning of 2017. As a result, the devolved insti-
tutions of the region have been less active in presenting
their views on Brexit. 
This situation is particularly important given that Brexit
raises unique and complex legal and practical issues, many
of which are linked to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement
(herea#er GFA).3 These issues include the question of the
territorial border; the threat to the island of Ireland as a s-
ingle economic area; the rights of the Irish passport holders
in the North; practical questions that are directly related to
the thousands of people who cross the border every day to
work and have access to childcare and healthcare, among
other activities.
All interested parties have underlined the importance of
the ‘Northern Irish question’ in the context of the Brexit ne-
gotiations. Former Taoiseach Enda Kenny has described
Brexit as ‘arguably the greatest economic challenge for this
island in 50 years’.4 The current Taoiseach, Leo Varadkar,
has noted that ‘every single aspect of life in Northern Ire-
land could be aﬀected by Brexit’.5
The EU has also recognised that ‘the unique circum-
stances and challenges on the island of Ireland will require
flexible and imaginative solutions’.6 At the same time, an
overwhelming majority of the European Parliament has
adopted a resolution urging all parties to remain commit-
ted to the peace process and to avoid implementing a hard
border.7
In her letter to President of the European Council Donald
Tusk with which she triggered Article 50 TEU, UK Prime
Minister Theresa May expressed her intention ‘to avoid a
return to a hard border’ as well.8 This position was broadly
in line with the post-referendum letter she received from
the then First Minister and the Deputy First Minister of
Northern Ireland in which the two figures highlighted the
need to ensure that the Irish border does not become an im-
pediment to the movement of goods, services and capital.9
More recently, the former Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland, James Brokenshire, noted that
we want to ensure that the Belfast or Good Friday Agreement
is fully protected … including the constitutional principles
that underpin it, the political institutions it establishes and
the citizens’ rights it guarantees.… Within the Northern Ire-
land-Ireland Dialogue, we have agreed that the Belfast or
Good Friday Agreement should be protected in full, including
its constitutional arrangements.10
If the UK had decided to remain in the single market and
the EUCU a#er Brexit, then the vast majority of the chal-
lenges Brexit raises with regard to Northern Ireland would
have been avoided. In her Lancaster House speech, howev-
er, Prime Minister May has clarified that the UK’s aim is to
leave both the single market and the EUCU.11 She repeated
1. See Scottish Government, Scotland’s Place in Europe, 20 December 2016.
2. See for instance the UK Government Response to Scotland’s Place in Europe, 29 March 2017. 
3. Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-belfast-agreement.
4. E. Kenny, ‘Irish Times Brexit Summit Keynote Address’, 7 November 2016.
5. ‘L. Varadkar Warns “Clock Is Ticking” on Brexit Talks’, BBC News, 4 August 2017.
6. See para. 14 of the EU Negotiating Directives, 22 May 2017.
7. European Parliament Resolution of 5 April 2017 on negotiations with the United Kingdom following its notification that it in-
tends to withdraw from the European Union (2017/2593 [RSP]).
8. Available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/article-50-letter-read-full-brexit-theresa-may-takes-uk-out-of-
eu-statement-a7655566.html.
9. Available at https://www.executiveoﬃce-
ni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/execoﬃce/Letter%20to%20PM%20from%20FM%20%26%20dFM.pdf.
10. J. Brokenshire, ‘Speech to the European Policy Centre’, Brussels, 6 November 2017.
11. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/17/theresa-mays-brexit-speech-full/, London, 17 January 2017.
I
Introduction
|     |12
A SPECIAL DESIGNATED STATUS FOR NORTHERN IRELAND
this message in her Florence speech12 and her Mansion
House speech.13 The proposal regarding the Irish border
that the UK government released reaﬃrms this position
vis-à-vis Northern Ireland. The proposal clarifies that the
region will fall outside the single market and the EUCU.14
This means that – at a minimum – a customs border will
need to be established on the territory of the island, which
is one of the main reasons why a number of EU oﬃcials
have dismissed the initial UK proposal on the Irish border.
According to these oﬃcials, ‘the UK government has fo-
cused on technical fixes around trade and customs’ al-
though ‘border issues are broader than economic ques-
tions’.15
The December Joint Report, however, has provided for a
pathway that could li# that gridlock. According to the re-
port, 
the United Kingdom remains committed to protecting North-
South cooperation and to its guarantee of avoiding a hard
border. Any future arrangements must be compatible with
these overarching requirements. The United Kingdom's in-
tention is to achieve these objectives through the overall EU-
UK relationship. Should this not be possible, the United King-
dom will propose specific solutions to address the unique cir-
cumstances of the island of Ireland. In the absence of agreed
solutions, the United Kingdom will maintain full alignment
with those rules of the Internal Market and the Customs U-
nion which, now or in the future, support North-South coop-
eration, the all-island economy and the protection of the
1998 Agreement.16
In other words, the overall aim of the negotiations would
be to address the challenge of the Irish border through the
overall EU-UK relationship. If that proves impossible, then
there is the possibility for specific solutions being applied
to Northern Ireland. Should there not be an agreement on
those specific technological solutions, then Northern Ire-
land at a minimum (or the UK as a whole) should remain
aligned to the single market and the EUCU. Indeed, that
third backstop option was legally codified in a Protocol on
Ireland/Northern Ireland contained in the dra# Withdrawal
Treaty published by the EU on 28 February 2018.17 Such a
concession has opened the possibility either for a diﬀeren-
tiated Brexit that would accommodate the special circum-
stances of Northern Ireland or for a rather ‘so#’ Brexit for
the whole UK.18
The starting point of this Independent Opinion is precise-
ly to understand and describe the special relationship that
Northern Ireland should enjoy with the EU should the
overall EU-UK relationship and the specific technological
solutions fail to eﬀectively address the Irish border. In any
case, according to the Joint Report, both the UK and the EU
have agreed to continue a ‘distinct strand of the negotia-
tions on the detailed arrangements required’19 for North-
ern Ireland. This Independent Opinion argues that the UK
Withdrawal Agreement needs to recognise the unique po-
sition and special circumstances and to put in place an
arrangement which will provide for a special designated s-
tatus for Northern Ireland, similar to the one described in
the dra# UK Withdrawal Agreement. Such a status should
protect and preserve all three Strands of the GFA (to be dis-
cussed in section 2.1 below), which would be in line not on-
ly with the EU’s commitment to protecting the GFA and
the peace process ‘in all its parts’20 but also with the recog-
nition from the UK government that the GFA is the
‘bedrock of the peace process’21, which must be protected
and safeguarded throughout the Brexit process. Both par-
ties aﬃrmed these commitments in the December Joint
Report.22
To this eﬀect, the following section discusses the defini-
tion of this special designated status. Section 3 analyses
how such a status should reflect the principle of consent
and the right of self-determination. Section 4 examines
how Ireland could remain a single economic area by allow-
ing for the participation of Northern Ireland in the single
market and the EUCU. It also discusses how the interests
of Northern Ireland could be represented in the EU in the
post-Brexit era. Finally, section 5 reflects on how the East-
West dimension should be strengthened in order to man-
age the tensions that Northern Ireland’s remaining in the
12. Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-florence-speech-a-new-era-of-cooperation-and-partnership-between-the-uk-
and-the-eu, Florence, 22 September 2017.
13. Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-on-our-future-economic-partnership-with-the-european-
union, London, 2 March 2018.
14. UK Government Position Paper, ‘Northern Ireland and Ireland’, 16 August 2017.
15. T. Connelly, ‘The Brexit Veto: How and Why Ireland Raised the Stakes’, RTÉ, 18 November 2017.
16. Joint Report from the negotiators of the EU and the UK Government on progress during phase 1 of negotiations under Article
50 TEU on the United Kingdom's orderly withdrawal from the EU (herea"er Joint Report), 8 December 2017, para. 49.
17. ‘Dra! Agreement on the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union
and the European Atomic Energy Community’ (herea"er Dra" UK Withdrawal Agreement), 19 March 2018, Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland.
18. See for example https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/dec/05/david-davis-northern-ireland-plan-apply-whole-uk-brex-
it-dup.
19. Joint Report (see note 16), para. 56.
20. European Council (Art. 50), ‘Guidelines Following the United Kingdom's Notification under Article 50 TEU’, 29 April 2017, para. 11.
21. UK Government Position Paper (see note 14), para. 6.
22. Joint Report (see note 16), para. 42.
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single market and the EUCU would likely cause to its eco-
nomic relationship with the rest of the UK. 
It is important to note that a recent survey suggests that,
notwithstanding the challenges such a special designated
status would create, the majority of the electorate in
Northern Ireland accepts and approves of such a status.23
At the end of the day, recognising ‘the diversity that is self-
evident in modern UK constitutional law through a unique
solution for Northern Ireland is in tune with the evolution
of the UK constitution over the last two decades’.24
23. J. Garry and J. Coackley, ‘Opinion Poll Results: Is There Support for a Border in the Irish Sea?’ UK in a Changing Europe, 28 November 2017. 
24. C. Harvey, ‘No, the Northern Ireland Brexit Solution Was Not Going to Break up the United Kingdom’, UK in a Changing Europe, 7
December 2017.
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2.1  Defining the Special
Designated Status
NORTHERN IRELAND is part of the United Kingdom, al-
though it enjoys a special constitutional status under-
lined by the GFA.25 The GFA regulates three types of in-
terlocking and interdependent relationships, or Strands:
relationships within Northern Ireland, relationships be-
tween Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland (the
North-South dimension), and relationships between
Britain and the Republic of Ireland (the East-West dimen-
sion). As one recent report put it, ‘The institutions [the G-
FA] established provided frameworks for cooperation be-
tween those entities’.26
The special constitutional status of Northern Ireland is fur-
ther highlighted by the legal significance of the Northern
Ireland Act 1998. In Robinson v Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland, Lord Bingham recognised that the 1998 Act
was passed to implement the Belfast Agreement, which was
itself reached, a!er much travail, in an attempt to end
decades of bloodshed and centuries of antagonism. The solu-
tion was seen to lie in participation by the unionist and na-
tionalist communities in shared political institutions, with-
out precluding … a popular decision at some time in the fu-
ture on the ultimate political status of Northern Ireland.27
He described the 1998 Act as ‘in eﬀect a constitution’.28
Lord Hoﬀmann added that it is ‘a constitution for Northern
Ireland framed to create a continuing form of government
against the background of the history of the territory and
the principles agreed in Belfast’.29
Although the text of the GFA does not include many refer-
ences to the EU,30 Elizabeth Meehan has explained that EU
membership has facilitated the design of the GFA:31 ‘The
sharing of sovereignty within the EU has spilled over into
some sharing of sovereignty over Northern Ireland’.32 In a
way, the GFA ‘was premised on the assumption of common
policies and interests across a wide range of policy areas’,33
which the EU membership of both the UK and the Republic of
Ireland had secured. In that sense, Brexit puts all three Strands
of the GFA at risk of deep fissures.34It challenges ‘the narrative
of a shared and interdependent Northern Ireland’35 and im-
pedes the sharing of sovereignty across the region, since the
UK and (by extension) Northern Ireland will no longer be
part of the EU. By definition, this situation will change the
balance of power in the East-West dimension. At the same
time, the EU framework will no longer be providing its
much-needed paradigm of power-sharing between the two
main communities. One particular danger is that at least
part of the segmented post-conflict society of Northern Ire-
land will not welcome the strengthening of more UK-centric
notions of sovereignty that Brexit might lead to. 
Finally, the creation of a customs border – at a minimum
II
What Is a Special Designated Status? 
25. For an analysis of the GFA, see C. Gallagher and K. O’Byrne, ‘Report on How Designated Special Status for Northern Ireland within the EU
Can Be Delivered’, 16 October 2017, 13–16. 
26. Ibid., 13–14.
27. Robinson v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 2002, UKHL 32, para. 10.
28. Ibid., para. 11.
29. Ibid., para. 33.
30. The text of the GFA has three sets of references to the EU. The first aims to ensure ‘eﬀective coordination and input by Ministers [from the Northern Ireland Exec-
utive] to national [UK] policy-making, including on EU issues’ (Strand One, para. 32). A second set relates to the work of the North South Ministerial Council
(Strand Two, para. 17; Strand Three, paras. 5 and 31). The third set underlines the need for the Irish and UK governments ‘to develop still further the unique rela-
tionship between their peoples and the close co-operation between their countries as friendly neighbours and as partners in the European Union’ (British-Irish
Agreement, Preamble). 
31. E. Meehan, ‘Britain’s Irish Question: Britain’s European Question? British-Irish Relations in the Context of European Union and the Belfast Agreement’, 26, Review
of International Studies (2000), 83. 
32. S. Douglas-Scott, ‘A UK Exit from the EU: The End of the United Kingdom or a New Constitutional Dawn?’, 9.
33. D. Phinnemore and K. Hayward, ‘UK Withdrawal (“Brexit”) and the Good Friday Agreement’, Study for the AFCO Committee, 7.
34. The Joint Report (see note 16) recognises that ‘the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union presents a significant and unique challenge in relation
to the island of Ireland’, para. 42. 
35. S. Farry and S. Eastwood, ‘How to Underpin a Special Deal for Northern Ireland’, UK in a Changing Europe, 31 October 2017.
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– will pose a significant threat to the island of Ireland as a
single economic area. In particular, such a development 
would not only require a massive investment by Ireland, as
the EU Member State required to enforce the EU external cus-
toms border with the UK at this point, but also bring back
painful memories of the times of conflict on the island, when
the trade border was not only (ab)used for intimidation
through its harsh enforcement, but also had a real impact on
livelihoods.36
John Doyle and Eileen Connolly have summed up the
threat that Brexit poses to the GFA. According to the au-
thors, the withdrawal process from the EU ‘has the poten-
tial to destabilise the idea of incremental progress embod-
ied in the Good Friday Agreement. The potential also exists
for increased instability to be deepened by the worsening
economic situation for Northern Ireland in a post-Brexit
world’.37
For all these reasons, it is critical that the special designat-
ed status be designed in such a way as to provide for eﬀec-
tive answers to the challenges to all three Strands. For the
internal dimension, the special status should take into ac-
count the principle of consent and the right of self-determi-
nation by providing for a legal route for the reintegration
of Northern Ireland into the EU, should the majority of the
people on both sides of the Irish border so decide in demo-
cratic and legally binding referendums. For the North-
South dimension, the special status should allow for the ef-
fective membership of Northern Ireland in the single mar-
ket and the EUCU and the representation of Northern Ire-
land’s interests within the EU. Finally, the special status
should absorb the tensions that remaining in the single
market might cause to Northern Ireland’s economic inte-
gration with the rest of the UK. 
Overall, the special designated status should be under-
stood as a mutually agreed arrangement that will respect
and protect the unique constitutional status of Northern
Ireland, as designed by the Good Friday Agreement, even
a#er Brexit.
2.2 Political Connotations of the Term
HAVING DEFINED the special designated status, we must
admit that, innocuous though the arrangement may sound,
a number of unionists perceive it as a political fracturing of
the UK and a path to a united Ireland. As such, they reject it
out of hand. The events of 4 December 2017 – when the
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and its leader, Arlene Fos-
ter, essentially vetoed the agreement that Prime Minister
May had achieved – provide for an insight into the strong
reservations that the unionist community has over a diﬀer-
entiated relationship with the EU. This is a very important
point that should not be overlooked.
To this eﬀect, it should be noted that the special designat-
ed status would benefit from the flexibility of the EU legal
order that has accommodated a number of territorially dif-
ferentiated arrangements in various areas of the world.38
The sovereignty of the respective metropolitan State over
a given area that enjoys such a diﬀerentiated arrangement
has never been challenged. For example, the fact that EU
law does not apply in the same way to the French Overseas
Territories as it does to the French mainland does not in any
way question France’s sovereignty over those territories.
Instead, those arrangements aim to accommodate the spe-
cific historical and political conditions present in those re-
gions. 
Indeed, the UK itself has made extensive use of this flexi-
bility. Gibraltar, the Channel Islands and a number of other
Overseas Territories have diﬀerent relationships with the
EU than the UK. Such diﬀerentiated membership with the
EU has not undermined those territories’ constitutional re-
lationships with the UK; in the same way, a similar solution
for Northern Ireland a#er Brexit would not threaten the
UK’s constitutional integrity. In that sense, the designated
status should not be understood as a staging post towards
a united Ireland. Instead, it should be viewed as a site-spe-
cific solution that will respect the special constitutional s-
tatus that Northern Ireland already enjoys within the UK
constitutional order, largely because of the GFA.
The aim of the special designated status is precisely the
protection of the GFA. At the core of the GFA is the princi-
ple of consent. In that sense, a special designated status
should be understood as an arrangement that would be ac-
cepted by all interested parties, including the unionist
community. A special designated status would necessitate
the consent of the EU, the United Kingdom, the Republic of
Ireland and the two main communities involved. Unless all
the parties consent to it, this status cannot be achieved. 
Having said that, the focus of all the interested parties
should not be on the term they will use to describe the
arrangement. Instead, they should focus on the content of
this arrangement. The aim of the designated special status
should be to protect the GFA and to preserve the fragile
balance of powers that it has achieved. In order to achieve
that balance, all three Strands of the GFA should be taken
into account.
36. D. Schiek, ‘The Island of Ireland and “Brexit” – A Legal-Political Critique of the Dra! Withdrawal Agreement’, TREUP Occasional Pa-
per, 6.
37. J. Doyle and E. Connolly, ‘Brexit and the Future of Northern Ireland’, DCU Brexit Research & Policy Institute Working Paper 1/2017. 
38. See section 4.1 of this Independent Opinion. 
|     |17
A SPECIAL DESIGNATED STATUS FOR NORTHERN IRELAND
III
The Internal Dimension 
3.1  Referendum(s) on Irish Unity
THE BALANCE OF POWER that the GFA has achieved may
be found in the compromises the UK and the Republic of
Ireland made regarding the self-determination of the peo-
ple of Northern Ireland.39 The Republic, for its part, accept-
ed the continuation of Northern Ireland’s place in the UK.
For the UK’s part, ‘Westminster has formally conceded that
Northern Ireland can secede from the United Kingdom to
join a united Ireland, if its people, and the people of the Irish
Republic, voting separately, agree to this’.40 According to
the Joint Report, both the EU and the UK ‘respect the provi-
sions of the 1998 Agreement regarding the constitutional
status of Northern Ireland and the principle of consent’.41
Section 1 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 is a rare exam-
ple of a provision of a constitutional statute explicitly
recognising the right of secession of a region.42 Unsurpris-
ingly, in the a#ermath of the Brexit referendum, Sinn Féin
has called for a referendum for the unification of Ireland.43
Politically speaking, however, such a scenario seems less
than probable in the immediate future. According to Sched-
ule 1 of the Northern Ireland Act, a referendum for the re-
unification of Ireland should be organised if ‘it appears like-
ly to [the UK Secretary of State] that a majority of those vot-
ing would express a wish that Northern Ireland should
cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a u-
nited Ireland’. Theresa Villiers, the former Northern Ireland
Secretary, made clear that there was ‘nothing to indicate
that there [was] majority support for a poll’.44
To this eﬀect, one must also bear in mind that the North-
ern Irish political parties do not agree about the need to
organise such a referendum. But a recent Lucid Talk poll
on whether a referendum on Irish unity should be held
suggests that 47.1 per cent of voters favour such a refer-
endum being held within five years, a further 14.8 per
cent said within ten years and 17.1 per cent said that such
a referendum should be held at some point further in the
future.45
3.2  Reunifying a Member State
NOTWITHSTANDING the political feasibility of a referen-
dum on Irish unity, it should be noted that the GFA was
founded on the principle of consent and recognises the
right of self-determination of the people of Northern Ire-
land. The UK Withdrawal Agreement should take into ac-
count this fundamental element of the peace process and
should provide for a legal avenue for the reintegration of
Northern Ireland within the EU constitutional and political
order, should the people of Northern Ireland and of the Re-
public of Ireland decide on the unification of the island in
separate, democratic and legally binding referendums. 
The secession of Northern Ireland would not mean the
creation of a new Member State. Instead, it would trigger
the territorial expansion of an EU Member State – the Re-
public of Ireland – to which EU law already applies, in ac-
cordance with Article 52 TEU. In a way, the reunification of
Ireland could follow the precedent of the German reunifi-
39. According to the Declaration of Support, the signatories to the Agreement ‘recognise that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement
between the two parts respectively and without external impediment, to exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently
given …’ (1.ii) and: ‘It would be wrong to make any change in the status of Northern Ireland save with the consent of a majority of its people’ (1.iii).
40. J. McGarry, ‘Asymmetrical Autonomy in the United Kingdom’, in M. Weller and K. Nobbs (Eds.), Asymmetric Autonomy and the Settlement of Ethnic Conflicts (Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 148, 156. 
41. Joint Report (see note 16), para. 44.
42. Other examples of constitutional provisions that provide for a right of secession include Art. 39(1) of the Ethiopian Constitution, according to which ‘every nation,
nationality or people in Ethiopia shall have the unrestricted right to self-determination up to secession’, and Art. 4(2) of the Constitution of the Principality of
Liechtenstein, according to which ‘individual municipalities shall be entitled to secede from the union. The decision on whether to initiate a secession procedure
shall be made by a majority of the Liechtenstein citizens eligible to vote who reside there. Secession shall be regulated by a law or, as the case may be, by an inter-
national treaty. If secession is regulated by a treaty, a second vote shall be held in the municipality a"er the treaty negotiations have been concluded’.
43. See www.businesspost.ie/sinn-fein-seeks-irish-reunification-vote-as-britain-votes-for-brexit/.
44. Available at www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jun/24/arlene-foster-northern-ireland-martin-mcguinness-border-poll-
wont-happen.
45. Available at http://lucidtalk.co.uk/images/News/LTOct17TrackerPoll-GeneralReport.pdf.
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cation,46 where the application of EU law was extended to
East Germany without an amendment of the primary leg-
islation, as agreed in a special meeting of the European
Council in Dublin on 28 April 1990.47 According to profes-
sor Dagmar Schiek ‘the necessary acts of secondary law
were adopted on the basis of delegation of powers to the
Commission, in order to avoid that the EU legislative
process was overtaken by the speed of historical events’.48
The diﬀerence is that, in the case of Germany, EU law did
not apply at all in East Germany before the reunification,
something that is very diﬀerent from the situation in
Northern Ireland.49
Former Taoiseach Kenny, however, has asked for a special
provision in any Brexit deal to allow Northern Ireland to re-
join the EU, should it be united with the Republic.50 The
question is therefore what such a provision would look like.
There are hardly any EU law provisions that regulate the u-
nification or reunification of Member States; the closest ex-
ample is Article 4 of Protocol no. 10 on Cyprus of the Act of
Accession 2003. Protocol no. 10 provides the terms for the
application of EU law to Cyprus, given that the island was
not unified at the time it joined the EU. In particular, the
protocol provides for the suspension of the application of
EU law in northern Cyprus – a suspension which will be li#-
ed in the event of a solution to the island’s division being
found.51 If such a solution is found in the future, Article 4
will provide for a simplified procedure that will enable the
EU to accommodate the terms of the reunification plan. In
particular, Article 4 allows the EU, by a unanimous Council
decision at a future date and in the event of reunification, to
alter the terms of Cyprus’s EU accession contained in the
Act of Accession 2003. In other words, Article 4 allows the
Council to amend ‘primary’ legislation (i.e. Act of Accession
2003) with a unanimous decision.
The amendment of primary legislation by a decision
might sound problematic, but the EU Treaties foresee spe-
cial procedures for such amendments in certain exceptional
cases. The best example, for the purposes of this Independ-
ent Opinion, is the Council decision on the basis of Article
2(2) of the 1994 Accession Treaty, which adjusted the in-
struments of accession a#er Norway’s failure to ratify its
EU Accession.52 Several articles of this Accession Treaty
and of the Act of Accession were amended by a Council de-
cision, while other provisions were declared to have lapsed.
Thus, in that case, the Council itself amended primary leg-
islation in a simplified procedure without the need for any
ratification by the Member States.
To the extent that the UK Withdrawal Agreement will be
considered to be part of primary legislation, a similar pro-
vision regulating the reunification of Ireland could be in-
cluded and could assist in the smooth transitioning of
Northern Ireland back to the EU. Of course, the question of
the reunification of Ireland – as with many other questions
related to Brexit – is first and foremost a political one. It is
important to point out, however, that EU law is flexible e-
nough to accommodate any such political developments.
46. For an analysis of the EU law implications of the German reunification, see C. Tomuschat, ‘A United Germany within the European Community’ (1990), 27 Com-
mon Market Law Review, 415; C. W. A. Timmermans, ‘German Unification and Community Law’ (1990), 27 Common Market Law Review, 437. 
47. The text is available at http://aei.pitt.edu/1397/1/Dublin_april_1990.pdf.
48. D. Schiek, ‘“Hard Brexit” – How to Address the New Conundrum for the Island of Ireland?’ TREUP Occasional Paper.
49. The relationship of the DDR (East Germany) with the then European Economic Community (EEC) was clarified in the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case
14/74, EU:C:1974:92. In that decision, the Court held that the relevant rules exonerating West Germany from applying the rules of EEC law to German internal
trade would ‘not have the result of making the German Democratic Republic part of the Community, but only that a special system [will apply] to it as a territory
which is not part of the Community’.
50. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/feb/23/irish-leader-enda-kenny-calls-for-united-ireland-provision-
in-brexit-deal. The European Council agreed on the following statement in the minutes to the agreement on the Brexit negotiating guidelines on 29 April
2017: ‘The European Council acknowledges that the Good Friday Agreement expressly provides for an agreed mechanism whereby a united Ireland may be
brought about through peaceful and democratic means; and, in this regard, the European Council acknowledges that, in accordance with international law, the
entire territory of such a united Ireland would thus be part of the European Union’. European Council, ‘Minutes of Special Meeting of the European Council (Art. 50)
Held on 29 April 2017’ (23 June 2017), available at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/xT-20010–2017-INIT/en/pdf.
51. Art. 1 of Protocol No. 10 on Cyprus of the Act of Accession 2003 (2003) OJ L 236/955.
52. Council Decision 95/1/EC, Euratom, ECSC of the Council of the European Union of 1 January 1995 adjusting the instruments concerning the accession of new
Member States to the European Union (1995) OJ L 1/1.
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IV
The North-South Dimension 
 APART FROM PROVIDING for a legal route for Northern
Ireland to reintegrate into the EU legal order, the special
designated status should also protect the island of Ireland
as a single economic area. It should do so by avoiding the
existence of a hard territorial border. In her speeches in
Lancaster House, Florence and Mansion House, Prime
Minister May has clarified that the aim of the UK is to leave
both the single market and the EUCU. This means that a ter-
ritorial customs border could only be avoided if Northern
Ireland were to achieve a diﬀerentiated relationship with
the single market and the EUCU, as the Protocol on Ire-
land/Northern Ireland in the dra# UK Withdrawal Agree-
ment provides. 
Although Brexit is an unprecedented phenomenon, it
should be noted that in a number of cases, diﬀerent parts of
a Member State have diﬀerent relationships with the EU.
Arguably, those diﬀerent parts are small territorial excep-
tions because of certain historical and political circum-
stances or even insularity. In addition, in all these cases, the
metropolitan State fully participates in the political and
constitutional life of the EU – something that would not ap-
ply to the case of the UK in the future. More importantly, in
all those cases, the relevant regions have opted out from ar-
eas of EU law, while Northern Ireland would opt in to the
EU legal order in case it wants to remain within the EU
without seceding from the UK. Still, it is important to revis-
it these cases in order to understand the legal mechanisms
that allow territorial diﬀerentiation within EU law and to
appreciate the remarkable flexibility of the EU legal order
in accommodating such diﬀerentiation. 
All those cases underline the fact that territorial diﬀeren-
tiation is an important characteristic of the EU legal order
that respects and accommodates rather than challenges the
constitutional relationships of the respective regions with
their metropolitan States. In fact, those diﬀerentiated
arrangements respond to specific needs that the constitu-
tional status of these areas has created and do not in any
way question the sovereignty of the metropolitan State. In
that sense, the special designated status should be under-
stood as a pragmatic solution to the specific circumstances
of Northern Ireland rather than as a staging post towards a
united Ireland. As David Phinnemore and Katy Hayward
have put it, ‘to argue therefore that Northern Ireland main-
taining regulatory equivalence with the EU would “threat-
en the economic and constitutional integrity of the United
Kingdom” is to needlessly and dramatically overstate the
extent of the implications of a diﬀerentiated arrangement
for Northern Ireland’.53
4.1  The Special Designated Status
in a Broader Context
TERRITORIAL/GEOGRAPHICAL exceptions to the appli-
cation of EU law are more common than conventional wis-
dom might suggest. Indeed, many Member States have
special territories which for either historical, geographical
or political reasons have diﬀering relationships with their
national governments – and consequently the EU as well –
from the rest of the Member State’s territory. Many of these
special territories do not participate in all (or any) EU policy
areas and programmes. Some have no oﬃcial relationship
with the EU, while others participate in EU programmes, in
line with the provisions of EU directives, regulations or pro-
tocols attached to EU treaties, and especially the relevant
Treaties of Accession.54
Eight regions of EU Member States are called outermost
53. Phinnemore and Hayward (see note 33), 46. 
54. For a comprehensive analysis of the application of EU law to Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) and to the Outermost Regions, see D. Kochenov (Ed.), On
Bits of Europe Everywhere: Overseas Possessions of the EU Member States in the Legal-Political Context of European Law (Kluwer Law International, 2013); D.
Kochenov, ‘Substantive and Procedural Issues in the Application of European Law in the Overseas Possessions of European Union Member States’ (2008) 17,
Michigan State International Law Review, 195; D. Kochenov, ‘The Impact of European Citizenship on the Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories with-
in the European Community’ (2009) 36, Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 239; F. Murray, EU and Member State Territories: The Special Relationship under Com-
munity Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 2004); J. Ziller, ‘Flexibility in the Geographical Scope of EU Law: Diversity and Diﬀerentiation in the Application of Substantive Law
on Member States’ Territories’, in G. de Búrca and J. Scott (Eds.), Constitutional Change in the EU: From Uniformity to Flexibility (Hart Publishing, 2000), 113; J. Ziller,
‘Les collectivités des outre-mer de l’Union européenne’, in J. Y. Faberon (Ed.), L’ Outre-mer Français: La nouvelle donne institutionelle (Documentation française,
2004); J. Ziller, ‘L’ Union européene et l’outre-mer’ (2005) 113 Pouvoirs, 145; J. Ziller, ‘The European Union and the Territorial Scope of European Territories’ (2007)
38, Victoria University Wellington Law Review, 51.
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regions,55 where the acquis, generally speaking, applies by
virtue of Article 355(1) TFEU. The Council, however, ‘taking
account of the structural social and economic situation’ of
these regions and ‘their remoteness, insularity, small size,
diﬃcult topography and climate, economic dependence on
a few products, the permanence and combination of which
severely restrain their development’, has adopted ‘specific
measures aimed, in particular, at laying down the condi-
tions of application’ of the Treaties to those regions, includ-
ing common policies.56 In practical terms, while EU law
does apply fully in these places, derogations to its applica-
tion do occur.57
Apart from the Outermost Regions, other territories enjoy
ad hoc arrangements in their relationships with the EU. In
most of these cases, their status is governed by protocols at-
tached to their respective countries’ accession treaties,
while the rest owe their status to EU legislative provisions
which exclude the territories from the application of the
relevant legislation. 
According to Article 355(3) TFEU, the EU Treaties apply
to ‘the European territories for whose external relations a
Member State is responsible’. In practice, Gibraltar is the
only territory covered by this clause. Gibraltar, a British o-
verseas territory, is part of the EU, having joined the EEC a-
longside the UK in 1973. By virtue of Article 28 of the UK
Accession Treaty, Gibraltar is outside the EUCU and VAT
area and is excluded from the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP). 
Pursuant to Article 355(4) TFEU, the EU Treaties also ap-
ply to the Åland Islands, a group of a group of Swedish-s-
peaking Finnish islands located between the coasts of Fin-
land and Sweden, in accordance with Protocol no. 2 of the
Finnish Act of Accession 1994. The aforementioned Proto-
col provides for derogations to the free movement of people
and services, the right of establishment and the purchase
or holding of real estate in the Åland Islands. 58
The EU Treaties apply to the Channel Islands and the Isle
of Man as well but to the extent necessary to ensure the im-
plementation of the ‘arrangements for those islands set out’
in Protocol no. 3 of the Act of Accession 1972.59 This eﬀec-
tively means that these islands are part of the EU only for
the purposes of customs and the free movement of goods
and in relation to certain aspects of the CAP. 
In contrast to the areas mentioned above, the Treaties do
not apply in the Faroe Islands, pursuant to Article 355(5)(a)
TFEU. Instead, the islands hold the status of a third country
that enjoys preferential treatment vis-à-vis the EU regulat-
ed by two basic agreements, one concerning fisheries60 and
the other trade.61
Another category of diﬀerentiated integration concerns
the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs), each of
which has a special relationship with one of the Member
States of the EU.62 Part four of the Treaty on the Function-
ing of the EU governs the OCTs’ relationship with the EU.
The OCTs were invited to form association agreements
with the EU63 and may opt in to EU provisions on the free-
dom of movement for workers64 and freedom of establish-
ment65. They are not subject to the EU’s common external
55. The Outermost Regions include French Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Martinique and Réunion, Saint-Barthélemy, Saint-Martin, the Spanish Canary Islands, and
the Portuguese Azores and Madeira. Mayotte became an outermost region of the EU on 1 January 2014, following a 2009 referendum with an overwhelming re-
sult in favour of departmental status.
56. Art. 349 TFEU. In June 2001 the Council adopted two sets of regulations based on the priorities identified in the Commission Report on the measures to imple-
ment Art. 299(2) TEC: the Outermost Regions of the European Union, COM(2000) 147, 14 March 2000. The first set of regulations (Council Regulations
1447/2001, 1448/2001, 1449/2001, 1450/2001, 1451/2001, [2001] OJ L198/1) aimed to take fuller account of the specific nature of the Outermost Regions
under the Structural Funds, as defined in Art. 349 TFEU, while the second set (Council Regulations 1452/2001, 1453/2001, 1454/2001, [2001] OJ L198/11)
aimed to amend the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in order to take greater account of the specific local conditions of the region.
57. For a comprehensive analysis of the application of the acquis in the Outermost Regions, see Kochenov, ‘Procedural Issues in the Application of European Law in
the Overseas Possessions of European Union Member States’ (see note 54), 227–244 and 268–286.
58. Act concerning the condition of accession of the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden and the adjust-
ments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded (1994) OJ C 241/21.
59. Art. 355(5)(c) TFEU.
60. Council Regulation (EEC) no. 2211/80 of 27 June 1980 on the conclusion of the agreement on fisheries between the European Economic Community and the
Government of Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands (1980) OJ L226/1. 
61. Council Decision 97/126/EC of 6 December 1996 concerning the conclusion of an agreement between the European Community, on the one part, and the Gov-
ernment of Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands, on the other (1997) OJ L53/1.
62. Twelve have such relationships with the UK: Anguilla, the Cayman Islands, the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, Montserrat, Pit-
cairn, Saint Helena and the Dependencies, the British Antarctic Territory, the British Indian Ocean Territory, the Turks and Caicos Islands, the British Virgin Islands,
and Bermuda (Bermuda, although formally an OCT listed in Annex II, does not benefit from the EU-OCT Association); five with France: New Caledonia and
Dependencies, French Polynesia, French Southern and Antarctic Territories, and the Wallis and Futuna Islands (known collectively as Territoires d’outre mer), and
Saint Pierre and Miquelon; two with the Netherlands: Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles (Bonaire, Curaçao Saba, Sint Eustatius and Sint Maarten); and one with
Denmark (Greenland).
63. Art. 198 TFEU.
64. Art. 202 TFEU.
65. Art. 199(5) TFEU.
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tariﬀ66 but may claim customs duties on goods imported
from the EU on a non-discriminatory basis.67 They are not
part of the EU, and EU law applies to them only insofar as
is necessary to implement the association agreements.68
Concerning the EU citizenship status of the inhabitants
of the OCTs, although the OCTs fall de jure outside the
territorial scope of the EU Treaties, their inhabitants are
considered EU citizens.69
Finally, for the sake of completeness, we could also refer
to the special status of the German enclave town of Büsin-
gen am Hochrhein and the Italian enclaves of Campione
d’Italia and Livigno (all of which are fully surrounded by
Switzerland) and the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla
on the Moroccan coast. All these enclaves, and the German
island of Heligoland, despite their diﬀerent locations, are
excluded from the EUCU70 and the VAT71 area. 
This brief study shows, in the most emphatic way, that the
application of EU law has been influenced on many occa-
sions by certain historical, political or even geographical
conditions. The width and breadth of the subject matter of
those territorial exceptions cannot be overstated. Having
said that, only in the case of Greenland was the territorial
diﬀerentiation a result of the decision of the people to with-
draw from the EU in a referendum. More importantly, in all
those cases, the metropolitan State has taken full part in the
political and constitutional life of the EU. It is important to
note for the purposes of this Independent Opinion that the
EU legal order allows for the diﬀerentiated application of
the acquis within diﬀerent parts of the same member state.
4.2  Remaining in the EU
and/or the Single Market
without Seceding from the UK
THE ONLY HISTORICAL PRECEDENT of a territory that
has voted to withdraw from the EU is Greenland, which is
an autonomous territory under Danish sovereignty. In
1982, Greenlanders voted against being subject to the EEC
Treaty. A#er three years of negotiations, the Member S-
tates concluded the Greenland Treaty on its new status un-
der EU law. According to this Treaty, Greenland became an
associated territory under Article 204 TFEU. As a result,
part four of TFEU, on the Association of the Overseas Coun-
tries and Territories, applies to Greenland. Nevertheless,
Greenlanders are still EU citizens.72
The fact that Greenland represents the only historical
precedent of a partial territorial withdrawal from the EU
has led a number of experts to discuss whether a ‘reverse
Greenland’ model could be used if Northern Ireland (and S-
cotland) decide to remain in the EU without seceding from
the UK.73 According to this model, the Treaties would be a-
mended to the extent that EU law would apply to Northern
Ireland but would not apply to the rest of the UK. Such a s-
cenario would entail that the UK would formally remain a
Member State of the EU. Alternatively, the UK and the EU
could agree to include (either in the Withdrawal Agree-
ment or in a separate international agreement) an arrange-
ment according to which the territorial application of EU
law would be extended to cover Northern Ireland as well. 
To a certain extent, such arrangement is what the backstop
option included in the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland
of the dra# UK Withdrawal Agreement tries to achieve. Ac-
cording to this option, a common regulatory area compris-
ing the EU and Northern Ireland would be established, and
the region would remain in the EU customs territory.74 As
Schiek has pointed out, however, the ‘access of Northern Ire-
land to the Internal Market [would be] reduced to goods, in-
cluding agricultural and electricity’, and that 
being excluded from the integrated EU market in services is
likely to have an additional stymying eﬀect not only on
growth in this important sector, but also on the desired rebal-
ancing of the [Northern Ireland] economy and the creation
of employment opportunities in a more inclusive way than
possible by growing [the] public sector, manufacturing and
agricultural employment. 75
Be that as it may, it is important to point out that, contrary
to conventional wisdom, a status of this kind that would
keep Northern Ireland part of the EUCU would not be u-
nique. The UK government at least seems amenable to the
idea that another region with a constitutional relationship
with the UK will remain within the EU customs territory:
the UK Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus. Similarly to the sit-
66. Art. 200(1) TFEU. 
67. Art. 200(3) and (5) TFEU.
68. Art. 355(2) TFEU.
69. See Eman and Sevinger v College van Burgemeester en Wethouders van Den Haag, C-300/04, EU:C:2006:545.
70. Art. 3 of Council Regulation (EEC) no. 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code (1992) OJ L302/1.
71. Art. 6 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value-added tax (2006) OJ L 347/1.
72. Treaty amending, with regard to Greenland, the treaties establishing the European Communities (1985) OJ L29/1; F. Weiss, ‘Greenland’s Withdrawal from the
European Communities’ (1985) 10, European Law Review, 173.
73. See for instance T. Lock, ‘A European Future for Scotland?’ Verfassungblog, 26 June 2016; A. Ramsay, ‘A Reverse Greenland: The EU Should
Let Scotland Stay’, Open Democracy UK, 24 June 2016.
74. Dra" UK Withdrawal Agreement (see note 17), Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, chap. III.
75. Dra" UK Withdrawal Agreement (see note 17), Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, chap. III.
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uation in Ireland, if those two base areas follow the UK out-
side the single market and the EUCU, then a hard border
would exist on the island of Cyprus. This is why the UK and
Cypriot governments are currently negotiating how they
might preserve the special EU status that those regions
have enjoyed since Cyprus joined the EU in 2004.76 In fact,
the Preamble to the Protocol on the Sovereign Base Areas
contained in the dra# UK Withdrawal Agreement clarifies
that the agreed arrangements will aim to keep those areas
part of the EU customs territory, although the EU treaties
will not apply.
Interestingly, keeping Northern Ireland and the UK Sov-
ereign Base Areas in Cyprus within the EU customs terri-
tory even a#er the UK ceases to be a Member State would
not be unprecedented. In the past, regions of a third country
were part of the EU customs territory in a few rare cases. For
instance, because of their geographical position, the Aus-
trian territories of Jungholz and Mittelberg have been part
of the EU customs territory77 since its establishment,78 long
before Austria joined the EU on 1 January 1995.
Alternatively, a number of academics have suggested that
Northern Ireland should remain in the European Economic
Area (EEA) and thus in the single market.79 The Scottish
government has put forward a similar proposal with regard
to Scotland.80 Both proposals envisage two pathways for
those regions to achieve EEA membership. The first option
entails a UK-sponsored membership, where the UK would
opt for membership in the EEA, but England and Wales
would have territorial exemptions. The EEA acquis would
fully apply only in Scotland and/or in Northern Ireland. The
precedent for this situation may also be found in the Arctic,
where Norway has secured a territorial exemption for the
islands of the archipelago of Svalbard that are not part of
the EEA.81
In the second option, an amendment of the European Free
Trade Association (EFTA) Convention and the EEA Agree-
ment could allow for the membership of sub-state entities.
To this eﬀect, it should be pointed out that although the
Faroe Islands is not an independent state, it is currently ex-
ploring the possibility of joining the EFTA82. Having said
that, one has to point out that the EEA countries are not
members of the EUCU. This means that, according to Phin-
nemore and Hayward, 
the EEA option would not … be a panacea. The question of a
hardening of the border would not be resolved. With the UK
outside a customs union with the EU, the need for customs
controls would remain, although their scope would be re-
duced if the UK-EU relationship comprised a deep and com-
prehensive free trade area. The EEA option would also leave
open the question of agricultural trade.83
Theoretically speaking, all the aforementioned options
are legally possible,84 but those options do come with cer-
tain consequences that would have to be dealt with. Were
the UK to leave the single market and the EUCU, as Prime
Minister May announced in her Lancaster House speech,
then there would be a customs frontier in the Irish Sea. And,
if the free movement of people applied in Northern Ireland
but not to the rest of the UK, the question would need to be
asked of how that situation might influence people crossing
between the two sides of the internal border, given the ex-
istence of the CTA.85 Section 5 of this Independent Opinion
discusses these consequences.
4.3  Representing the Interests
of Northern Ireland
AS STATED in the Joint Report, ‘Cooperation between Ire-
land and Northern Ireland is a central part of the 1998 A-
greement and is essential for achieving reconciliation and
the normalisation of relationships on the island of Ire-
land’.86 In that sense, avoiding a hard territorial border on
the territory of Ireland is a necessary but insuﬃcient con-
dition in order to protect and preserve the GFA. In the De-
cember Joint Report, the EU and the UK both conceded that
Brexit has given rise ‘to substantial challenges to the main-
tenance and development of North-South cooperation’.87 A
special designated status should thus ensure that North-
76. Protocol no. 3 on the Sovereign Base Areas of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Cyprus of the Act of Accession 2003 (2003) OJ L
236/940.
77. Art. 3 of Council Regulation (EEC) no. 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code (1992) OJ L302/1.
78. Art. 1 of Regulation (EEC) of the Council of 27 September 1968 on the definition of the customs territory of the Community (1968) OJ L238/1.
79. B. Doherty et al., ‘Northern Ireland and Brexit: The European Economic Area Option’, EPC Discussion Paper, 7 April 2017.
80. See note 1.
81. Protocol 40 on Svalbard of the Agreement on the European Economic Area (1994) OJ L1/208.
82. For an analysis of the EU status of the Faroe Islands, see J. Hartmann, ‘The Faroe Islands: Possible Lessons for Scotland in a New Post-Brexit
Devolution Settlement’.
83. Phinnemore and Hayward (see note 33), 45.
84. For a comprehensive discussion of all possible scenarios, see C. Gallagher and K. O’Byrne, ‘Report on How Designated Special Status for Northern
Ireland within the EU Can Be Delivered’ (see note 25).
85. The Common Travel Area (CTA) is a special travel zone between the Republic of Ireland and the UK, the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands. The CTA dates back
to the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922. Nationals of CTA countries can travel freely within the CTA without being subject to passport controls.
86. Joint Report (see note 16), para. 47.
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South cooperation includes mechanisms that would take
into account the views of Northern Ireland with regard to
the EU. 
A number of paradigms currently exist about how diﬀer-
ent Member States take the views of their various regions
into account when formulating policies at the EU level.88 In
Germany, for instance, the Bundesrat plays a pivotal role in
ensuring that the views of the various Länder can be taken
into account in terms of EU aﬀairs.89 In Belgium, the Direc-
torate for European Aﬀairs in the Foreign Ministry is re-
sponsible for coordinating the Belgian position within the
EU. In order to achieve these activities, the Directorate reg-
ularly convenes a Coordination Committee on European
Aﬀairs. Every decision on the Belgian position is reached in
the Directorate General by representatives of the federal
prime minister and deputy prime ministers, of the minis-
ter-presidents of the diﬀerent sub-state entities, and of
those ministers who are responsible for the specific sub-
jects on the agenda.90
In the case of Northern Ireland, the North-South institu-
tions, and in particular the North-South Ministerial Coun-
cil (NSMC), could be used so that the voice of Northern Ire-
land could be heard within the EU. In particular, a mecha-
nism could be created according to which the Irish posi-
tions in the Council of the EU and the EU Council would be
formulated a#er taking into account the interests of North-
ern Ireland as expressed in the NSMC.91 In fact, the GFA
stipulates that the NSMC’s views should be ‘taken into ac-
count and represented appropriately at relevant EU meet-
ings’.92
The North-South institutions could be used so that the in-
terests of Northern Ireland would be taken into account in
the Council of the EU and in the EU Council in particular.
According to the Joint Report, however, ‘the people of
Northern Ireland who are Irish citizens should continue to
enjoy rights as EU citizens, including where they reside in
Northern Ireland’.93 One could question whether these
rights include their voting rights in European Parliamen-
tary elections.94 Interestingly, the case law of the Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) does not prohibit an
arrangement according to which the residents of Northern
Ireland would continue to vote and stand in European Par-
liamentary elections, even a#er Brexit. In Spain v UK, the
question arose of whether the UK could extend to residents
of Gibraltar the rights to vote and stand as candidates in Eu-
ropean Parliamentary elections. The CJEU noted that
in the current state of [EU] law the definition of persons en-
titled to vote and to stand as a candidate in the EP elections
falls within the competence of each Member State in compli-
ance with [EU] law and that [the member states are not pre-
cluded] from granting that right to vote and to stand as a
candidate to certain persons who have close links to them,
other than their own nationals or EU citizens residents in
their territory.95
This would mean that EU law would not prohibit the Re-
public of Ireland from extending voting rights for European
Parliamentary elections to the residents of Northern Ire-
land. At the end of the day, a significant number of these res-
idents will continue to hold Irish passports, even a#er Brex-
it. Such an arrangement would respect the birthright of ‘all
the people of Northern Ireland’ to ‘identify themselves and
accept [that they are] Irish or British, or both’.96
The dra# UK Withdrawal Agreement recognises the need
for the interests of Northern Ireland to be represented in
certain EU for a as well. Article 12(4) of the Protocol on Ire-
land/Northern Ireland provides for the representation of
the UK within Commission Implementation procedures
and in expert groups where necessary.
Having said that, it should also be noted that in order for
Northern Ireland to eﬀectively participate in the single
market and the EUCU, a fundamental constitutional a-
mendment to the relevant Devolution Act (or Acts) would
need to occur. This amendment would be necessary so that
the devolved administration would have the relevant com-
petences to make decisions at the EU/EEA level. 
The flexible nature of the idiosyncratic UK constitution
suggests that this hurdle will not be insurmountable from
a legal point of view. But such an amendment to the devo-
lution arrangement would mark the complete transforma-
tion of the UK into one of the most decentralised States in
87. Ibid.
88. For diﬀerent models of representation at the various institutions, see N. Skoutaris, ‘The Role of Sub-State Entities in the EU Decision-Making Processes: A Com-
parative Constitutional Law Approach’, in E. Cloots, G. De Baere and S. Sottiaux (Eds.), Federalism in the European Union (Hart Publishing, 2012), 210.
89. Art. 23 (4)-(5) of the German Basic Law.
90. Samenwerkingsakkoord van 8 maart 1994 tussen de Federale Staat, de Gemeenschappen en de Gewesten en het Verenigd College van de Gemeenschappelijke
Gemeenschapscommissie, met betrekking tot de vertegenwoordiging van het Koninkrijk België in de ministerraad van de Europese Unie (Belgisch Staatsblad, 17
November 1994).
91. his idea was first developed and argued by Sinn Féin. See ‘The Case for the North to Achieve Designated Special Status within the EU’, 7.
Other parties have agreed with this Sinn Féin–inspired idea. For instance, the leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), Colum Eastwood, has not-
ed that ‘the North-South structures could come into their own – ensuring that we are not cut oﬀ from the broader island economy and the European Union’.
92. Strand Two, para. 17.
93. Joint Report (see note 16), para. 52.
94. Art. 22 TFEU.
95. Spain v UK C-145/04 EU:C:2006:543, para. 78.
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the world. The UK government would have to at least share
its competences with the Northern Ireland Executive, even
in the areas of external relations and defence, to the extent
that Northern Ireland might want to participate in the
Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Se-
curity and Defence Policy. 
At the same time, the UK and the EU would have to ‘estab-
lish mechanisms to ensure the implementation and over-
sight of any specific arrangement to safeguard the integrity
of the EU Internal Market and the Customs Union’, as noted
in the Joint Report.97 This is rather unsurprising if one takes
into account the fact that Member States must ensure the
‘proper application of European Union law’.98 This state-
ment is a reference to Article 4 TEU, according to which an
EU Member State should ‘take any appropriate measure,
general or particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obliga-
tions arising out of the EU Treaties or resulting from the
acts of the institutions of the Union’.99
In particular, within constitutional orders where a territo-
rial distribution of powers exists, the relevant Member S-
tates must establish a mechanism to ensure compliance
with EU law in the case of a regional ‘blocking’ (i.e. the in-
ability of a Member State region to comply with a certain
piece of EU legislation). The reason for this is that the CJEU
has repeatedly held that a member state may not plead that
provisions, practices or circumstances exist in its internal
legal system in order to justify a failure to comply with the
obligations and time limits laid down in a directive.100 The
problem in the case of Northern Ireland is that the UK and
the EU would have to create a mechanism of oversight of
implementation for a region that would fall within the ter-
ritory of a non-EU country. This would be unprecedented.
The dra# UK Withdrawal Agreement tries to ‘square the cir-
cle’ by entrusting the Joint Committee101 and the Specialised
Committee102 with such a role. More interestingly, Article
11 of the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland provides that
supervision and enforcement of the Protocol will rely on the
CJEU as well as the EU Commission and other EU agencies.
96. Declaration of Support (1.iv).
97. Joint Report (see note 16), para. 51.
98. Council of the European Union, Seville European Council, 21 and 22 June 2002, Presidency Conclusions (13463/02), para. 24.
99. Art. 4(3) TEU.
100. Commission v Spain, C-107/96, EU:C:1997:286; Commission v Belgium, C-323/97, EU:C:1998:347.
101. Dra" UK Withdrawal Agreement (see note 17), Art. 157.
102. Dra" UK Withdrawal Agreement (see note 17), Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, Art. 10.
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103. Farry and Eastwood (see note 35).
104. Cyprus is the only member state where the acquis does not apply to a significant part of its territory and a territorial border is in place between the part where
the acquis applies and where it does not. Of course, the historical and political conditions that led to the suspension of the acquis in Cyprus do not bear any re-
semblance to the post-Brexit political situation in the UK. However, the legal arrangements that were used to accommodate the Cyprus problem could oﬀer
some much-needed inspiration if Northern Ireland were to decide to remain in the EU and/or the single market without seceding from the UK.
105. Art. 2(1) of Council Regulation (EC) no. 866/2004 of 29 April 2004 on a regime under Article 2 of Protocol 10 to the Act of Accession (2004) OJ L 206/51 (here-
a"er Green Line Regulation).
106. Art. 2(2) of the Green Line Regulation.
107. Joint Report (see note 16), para. 54.
108. T. McGuiness and M. Gower, ‘The Common Travel Area and the Special Status of Irish Nationals in UK Law’, House of Commons Briefing
Paper no. 7661, 18.
V
The East-West Dimension 
ACCORDING TO STEPHEN FARRY and Sorcha Eastwood,
‘Remaining in the single market and customs union is the
most logical conclusion to maintaining [the] integrated all
Island economy and safeguarding the Good Friday Agree-
ment’.103 Such a decision, however, would lead to tensions
in the economic integration of Northern Ireland with the
rest of the UK. Northern Ireland would continue to adhere
to the four fundamental freedoms, while the rest of the UK
would be out of the single market and the EUCU, as Prime
Minister May has explicitly stated. This is why East-West
institutions should be further strengthened. Both the Unit-
ed Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland should achieve
higher levels of coordination in order for a shared and in-
terdependent Northern Ireland to successfully remain in
the EU without having to secede from the UK. 
5.1  The Irish Sea Border
ARTICLE 21 TFEU provides that every EU citizen has the
‘right to move and reside freely within the territory of the
Member States’. One of the declared goals of Brexit is to ter-
minate the application of the free movement of people in
the UK. But if Northern Ireland remains in the single mar-
ket, the relevant Treaty provisions would then apply to part
of the territory of the UK. This situation means that a border
could exist between one area where free-movement acquis
applies and the rest of the UK, where it does not. 
Northern Ireland would not be a unique case where free-
movement acquis would apply in part of the territory of a
State. For instance, in Cyprus,104 where the free movement
of people is suspended only in part of its territory, the Re-
public of Cyprus conducts checks on everyone who crosses
the internal boundary called the Green Line, with the aim
of combating the illegal immigration of third-country na-
tionals and to detect and prevent any threats to public se-
curity and public policy.105 Everyone who crosses the Green
Line must undergo at least one such check in order to es-
tablish his or her identity.106 If a similar measure were to be
applied to the maritime border between Northern Ireland
and the rest of the UK, then it would be the Northern Irish
authorities who would have to police this new EU border. 
Of course, in the case of Northern Ireland, given the exis-
tence of the CTA, there is no need for such a hard border, at
least for British and Irish citizens. In fact, the December
Joint Report accepts that ‘the United Kingdom and Ireland
may continue to make arrangements between themselves
relating to the movement of persons between their territo-
ries (Common Travel Area), while fully respecting the
rights of natural persons conferred by Union law’.107 This
provision has been repeated verbatim in the agreed Article
2 of the dra# Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland.
As already mentioned, however, there would be a need for
a mechanism to distinguish between British and Irish citi-
zens on the one hand and third-country nationals on the
other. A more realistic option that some have suggested
would entail that immigration checks be conducted in
places other than borders. For instance, Raoul Ruparel has
argued that ‘the enforcement of ensuring people do not
overstay’ can take place ‘via other mechanisms such as reg-
ulating access to social security and the job market’.108 In
fact, ‘through successive reforms of the Immigration Act,
the UK government has [already] introduced in-land con-
trols by employers, landlords, banks and educational estab-
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lishments for the movement of persons, thus rendering per-
son controls at borders less relevant from their perspec-
tive’.109 In a recent report, however, the Committee on the
Administration of Justice expressed its concerns about such
a system, in particular its compatibility with human rights
standards.110
Undoubtedly, all the aforementioned arrangements sound
onerous and cumbersome, but it should be noted that un-
less a similar arrangement to the one described in this sec-
tion is achieved with regard to Northern Ireland, the same
problems will occur mutatis mutandis in the Irish territo-
rial border post-Brexit.111 The diﬀerence would be that a
hard Irish border would pose a significant threat to the sta-
bility of the fragile peace process.
Concerning the free movement of persons, the challenges
that would arise if Northern Ireland remains in the single
market would be identical, whether Northern Ireland par-
ticipated in the EU or the EEA. With regard to the free move-
ment of goods, however, the choice between the two is sig-
nificant, the reason being that if an area is not within the EU
(including those that are part of the EEA), then it is outside
the EUCU and thus has a customs border with the European
Union. At the same time, this situation means that the area
could negotiate its own free trade and customs unions.
Starting with the scenario in which Northern Ireland re-
mains within the EUCU, a new customs border would exist
between the region and the rest of the UK, given that the
current administration has clarified that their goal is for the
UK to be outside the EUCU. It is interesting to look at how
the EU managed to regulate its trade relations with north-
ern Cyprus, which is outside the EUCU and where the free
movement of goods does not apply. The UK government
has explicitly referred to the internal Cypriot border as one
example ‘of where the EU has set aside the normal regula-
tions and codes set out in EU law in order to recognise the
circumstances of certain border areas’.112
In agreement with the Republic of Cyprus, the EU autho-
rised a Turkish Cypriot NGO, the Turkish Cypriot Chamber
of Commerce,113 to issue accompanying documents so that
goods originating in northern Cyprus may cross the line
and be circulated in southern Cyprus and the EU market.
More importantly, those goods are deemed to have origi-
nated in Cyprus/the EU and thus are not subject to customs
duties or charges having equivalent eﬀect when they are
introduced in southern Cyprus.114 Similar agencies could be
authorised in the rest of the UK so that traders would not
face the EU’s common external tariﬀ, even when they ‘ex-
port’ goods to Northern Ireland. Alternatively, the free
crossing of goods with tighter checks could be allowed at
certain focal points, such as ports and airports. For the flow
of goods from Northern Ireland to the rest of the UK, it is
important to note that the UK government has pledged that
it ‘will continue to ensure the same unfettered access for
Northern Ireland’s businesses to the whole of the United K-
ingdom internal market’, as it has the right to do.115
Of course, if the UK signs a free trade agreement with the
EU, then goods that are wholly obtained or have undergone
their last, substantial, economically justified processing or
working in an undertaking equipped for that purpose in the
rest of the UK,116 to use the legal terminology, would not be
subject to customs duties or charges of equivalent eﬀect.117
All the other goods, however, would face the EU common
external tariﬀ.
This is perhaps why the group of academics118 mentioned
earlier (and the Scottish government119) have prioritised
that Northern Ireland (and Scotland) should remain in the
EEA. Doing so would allow goods originating from those
regions to move freely in the EU while remaining outside
of the EUCU. In that case, the border between the Republic
of Ireland and Northern Ireland would resemble the
Swedish/Norwegian customs border, where the use of tech-
nology has mitigated the disruptions from having a cus-
toms border between one State that is within the EUCU and
one that is not.
5.2 East-West Institutions
AS WE MENTIONED BEFORE, having a special status
should not be understood as a staging post towards a united
109. D. Schiek (see note 36), 12.
110. Available at ‘Brexit and Northern Ireland: A Briefing on Threats to the Peace Agreement’, 5.
111. The Scottish government also underlined the analogy between the post-Brexit situation with the Irish border and the territorial border between England and
Scotland if the latter remains in the single market. In the 2016 blueprint on ‘Scotland’s Place in Europe’ (see note 1), the government suggested that whatever
instruments are used for the Northern Ireland / Republic of Ireland border should also be applied mutatis mutandis between Scotland and England.
112. UK government position paper (see note 14), para. 42. For an analysis see N. Skoutaris, ‘Footnotes in Ireland’, On Secessions, Constitutions and EU Law,
18 August 2017.
113. Art. 4(5) of the Green Line Regulation; Commission Decision 2004/604/EC of 7 July 2004 on the authorisation of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce
according to Art. 4(5) of Council Regulation (EC) no. 866/2004 (2004) OJ L 272/12. 
114. Art. 4(2) of the Green Line Regulation.
115. Joint Report (see note 16), para. 50.
116. Council Regulation (EEC) no. 2913/92 establishing the Union Customs Code (1992) OJ L 302/1.
117. A similar arrangement applies to goods originating in northern Cyprus: Art. 4(2) of the Green Line Regulation.
118. B. Doherty et al. (see note 79).
119. See note 1.
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Ireland. Instead, such a status should be understood as a
mutually agreed arrangement that would preserve the
fragile balance of powers the GFA has established. It should
enhance the notions of shared sovereignty and interde-
pendence that the Northern Irish peace process was found-
ed upon. At the same time, if Northern Ireland were to re-
main in the single market and/or the EUCU, then that situ-
ation would admittedly raise challenges to Northern Ire-
land’s economic integration with the rest of the UK. 
Those challenges are not insurmountable, as we have ex-
plained earlier in this Independent Opinion, but they would
create a special and unique regime. In this scenario, North-
ern Ireland would remain part of the UK but would achieve
a higher level of economic integration with the EU than the
rest of the UK will enjoy. At the same time, the Republic of
Ireland would be entrusted with voicing the concerns and
the interests of the region within the EU. In that sense, it is
of utmost importance that both the UK, as the metropolitan
State, and the Republic of Ireland, as the closest ally of the
region within the EU, would enhance their mutual cooper-
ation by strengthening East-West institutions. The special
designated status of Northern Ireland should be protected
and facilitated by the close cooperation of those two States.
Such a strengthening would be in accordance with the prin-
ciple of consent and the notions of shared sovereignty and
interdependence. In any case, ‘approaches to EU issues’ are
already among the suitable matters of discussion for the
British-Irish Council. 120
120. Strand Three, paras. 5 and 31.
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VI
Concluding Remarks 
THIS INDEPENDENT OPINION suggests that the UK
Withdrawal Agreement should recognise the various spe-
cial and unique circumstances related to Northern Ireland.
The agreement should do so by providing for a special des-
ignated status. Such a status should be understood as a mu-
tually agreed arrangement that will respect and protect the
unique constitutional status of the region, as provided by
all three strands of the Good Friday Agreement. In particu-
lar, the special status should respect the principle of con-
sent and the right of self-determination by providing for a
legal route for the reintegration of Northern Ireland into
the EU. The special status should help to protect the all-is-
land economy by allowing for the participation of the re-
gion in the single market and/or the EUCU. This should not
happen at the expense of weakening East-West institutions;
in fact, the strengthening of these institutions will be nec-
essary in order to manage any tensions that Northern Ire-
land’s remaining in the single market and the EUCU would
likely cause to its economic relationship with the rest of the
UK.
Notwithstanding the legal feasibility of this special sta-
tus, this Independent Opinion admits that the greater chal-
lenge in reaching such an arrangement will lie in building
a consensus about what would constitute the unique and i-
maginative solution that will have to be found for Northern
Ireland. It is important to stress that the principle of con-
sent that the GFA is founded upon necessitates the agree-
ment of all interested parties in order for Northern Ireland
to enjoy such a special status. At the same time, unless such
an arrangement is reached, the fragile balance that the GFA
has established will be threatened. The very logic of the
peace process dictates that Northern Ireland should enjoy
a special designated status within the EU by taking into ac-
count and strengthening all three strands. 
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